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INTRODUCTION
Since the early discoveries of the Spindletop, King Ranch, and East
Texas oil fields, the oil and gas industry has dominated the Texas economy.
The industry has also played an important role in shaping state politics and
culture. The oil boom of the early 1900s created thousands of jobs for ordi-
nary workers and immense wealth for a select few. Early Texas oil barons
made headlines because of their lavish lifestyles and often extreme political
beliefs.1 Legendary wildcatter H.L. Hunt typified this oil-fueled exuber-
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Michigan Law School; M.S., 2012, Texas Tech
University; B.A., 2010, Southwestern University. The author would like to thank Professor
Sara Gosman for her guidance and feedback during the development of this Note, and Laura
Napoli for inspiring the topic. Thanks also to Steve Scheele and Sarah Wightman for their
editorial judgment, insight, and leadership. Any mistakes or omissions are my own.
1. For an excellent study of the early days of the Texas oil industry and four of the
most prominent wildcatters of the time, H. Roy Cullen, Sid Richardson, Clint Murchison,
385
386 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 4:2
ance. Hunt became one of the eight richest individuals in the United States
after securing mineral rights to the East Texas oil field (the largest oil field
in the contiguous United States) from an unscrupulous land man at a poker
game. Hunt used his tremendous resources to support conservative politi-
cians (including Joseph McCarthy) and to promote a conservative political
agenda.2 Hunt’s politics, particularly his focus on the primacy of individual-
ism and his belief that government intervention posed the greatest single
threat to individual liberty, helped to shape the broader neoconservative
movement. His political influence continues to resonate throughout the
modern political dialogue in Texas.3
Before Hunt became a billionaire, he was a wildcatter—an independent
oil producer who bought up mineral rights and drilled exploratory wells in
the hopes of striking it rich. Hunt, along with other independents,4 played a
large role in the development of Texas oil fields. Independents competed
with major oil companies and used their influence in the Texas legislature to
maintain a regulatory environment that gave small producers a competitive
advantage over large producers.5 The political sway of independent produc-
ers has resulted in Texas’ failure to implement an efficient oil and gas regu-
latory system, and has contributed to unnecessary waste, wells, drilling
expense, and environmental harm to the state.
Texas was among the last of the oil producing states to pass a compul-
sory pooling statute. Compulsory pooling statutes allow state agencies to
compel mineral rights owners to combine their acreage to form a spacing
unit of sufficient size to prevent waste.6 Most compulsory pooling statutes
require landowners to make good faith efforts to reach private agreement
and H.L. Hunt, see BRYAN BURROUGH, THE BIG RICH: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREATEST TEXAS
OIL FORTUNES (2009). These men and their fortunes played a large role in shaping state and
national politics, and their influence shaped Texas’ political landscape that made it so diffi-
cult to pass pooling and unitization statutes.
2. Jerrell Dean Palmer, Hunt, Haroldson Lafayette, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (June 15,
2010), https://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fhu59. In addition to bankrol-
ling two conservative talk radio programs from 1951-63, Hunt published a utopian novel in
which he suggested that more votes should be given to the oldest and wealthiest members of
society, and that political speech should be limited to print media.
3. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in Texas Judicial Elections: The Sickness and
its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263, 268 (2000).
4. “Independent” simply indicates an individual not affiliated with a major oil
company.
5. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The Eighty-Six
Percent Factor, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 492 (1994). Part II of the Article is titled “The Texas
Legislature and the Conservation Laws: Worshiping the Independent.”
6. See infra Section I.B, The Small Tract Advantage.
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regarding royalty allocation before the state will compel pooling.7 If private
agreement is not reached, the state will designate the boundaries of the
spacing unit and the well site and allocate royalties on a per-acre basis.8
The legislative hesitation was primarily due to compulsory pooling’s
unpopularity among politically powerful independent producers who
benefitted from Texas Railroad Commission (Commission) field rules that
gave independent producers a disproportionate advantage. Texas’ compul-
sory pooling statute only gained enough political support after the Texas
Supreme Court invalidated the Commission’s unfair rules in a landmark
case and required the Commission to promulgate new rules that reduced the
independents’ advantage.9 The court’s willingness to act in promotion of
wise resource use, combined with newly aggressive Commission field rules
that promoted pooling to increase efficiency spurred the Texas Legislature
(Legislature) to act. However, despite the success of the mandatory pooling
legislation in combatting waste, there remains little political support for a
compulsory unitization statute that would allow producers to maximize sec-
ondary recovery efforts in Texas’ oil and gas fields.
Today, Texas remains the only oil producing state without a compulsory
unitization statute. Whereas pooling allows the operation of a spacing unit
overlying a reservoir without regard to the property boundaries that cross
the spacing unit, unitization allows the operation of the entire oil field as a
single unit. Because unitized fields operate without regard to spacing units
that would otherwise overlay the field, unitized field operators are able to
place the minimum number of wells needed to recover the resource and,
thus, take steps to efficiently manage field pressure. Generally, unitization
is more common in secondary recovery efforts, in which producers re-pres-
surize a depleted field using salt water or carbon dioxide gas to aid in the
movement of fluid hydrocarbons through porous geological formations.10
Part I of this Note examines the court decisions and regulatory context that
led to the passage of Texas’ compulsory pooling statute, the Mineral Inter-
est Pooling Act (MIPA), in 1965. Part II examines the landmark Texas Su-
preme Court case that precipitated MIPA, and the administration of the
modern version of this statute. Part III of this Note examines Texas legisla-
7. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2014) (requiring that landowners
attempt to reach a voluntary pooling agreement before the Division of Oil and Gas Re-
sources Management will issue a mandatory pooling order).
8. See id. at § 1509.27.
9. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 346 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1961).
10. For a general description of primary and secondary recovery methods, as well as a
game-theoretic examination of when and under what conditions rational individual owners
will cooperate, see Paula Murray & Frank Cross, The Case for a Texas Compulsory Unitization
Statute, 23 ST. MARY’S L. J. 1099 (1992).
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tors’ efforts to pass a compulsory unitization statute, and Part IV discusses
the consequences of failing to do so.
I. HISTORY OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION IN TEXAS
The efficiency of Texas’ oil and gas production has national and global
significance. Roughly thirty percent of the oil produced in the United
States comes from Texas, and the proportion is similar for natural gas.11 If
Texas were a stand-alone country, it would be the fourteenth largest oil
producing and the third largest natural gas producing country in the world.
Energy forecasters project that the United States will become the largest
producer of oil and gas in the near future, largely due to the development of
Texas shale plays including the Eagle Ford, Haynesville, and Barnett forma-
tions.12 Unconventional development of oil and natural gas reserves will
play a critical role in increasing U.S. energy independence from countries
like Venezuela, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which, in turn, could advance Amer-
ican national security interests.13 While some of the advantages of increased
energy production seem obvious, the specter of H.L. Hunt’s individualist
political views has hindered efficient production in Texas’ oil fields.
Despite Texas’ importance as the dominant domestic oil and gas pro-
ducer, its regulatory system has lagged behind other states. The Lone Star
State has a long history of favoring strong private property rights and Texas
legislatures have been criticized for resisting policies that would sacrifice
individual rights for the sake of the common good.14 As the history of Texas
oil and gas development reveals, an unyielding preference for individual
rights can lead to unreasonable results. To avoid severe negative economic
consequences, Texas courts have acted in equity to prohibit policies that
favored independent producers.
The Texas Legislature responded to the court’s decision by passing
MIPA, a statute designed to promote cooperative and efficient development
11. David Blackmon, The Texas Shale Oil & Gas Revolution – Leading the Way to En-
hanced Energy Security, FORBES.COM, (March 19, 2013, 10:13 A.M.), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/davidblackmon/2013/03/19/the-texas-shale-oil-gas-revolution-leading-the-way-to-en-
hanced-energy-security/.
12. U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. EXPECTED TO BE LARGEST PRODUCER OF
PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS HYDROCARBONS IN 2013, (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=13251; see also U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION,
GROWTH IN U.S. HYDROCARBON PRODUCTION FROM SHALE RESOURCES DRIVEN BY DRILLING EFFI-
CIENCY, (March 11, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15351.
13. See Luis E. Cuervo, OPEC From Myth to Reality, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 433 (2008).
14. Texas Political Culture, TEXAS POLITICS (2009), http://www.laits.utexas.edu/
txp_media/html/cult/ (describing the three major pillars of Texas’ political culture and politi-
cal ideology as classical liberalism, social conservatism, and populism).
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of oil and gas resources. This victory for efficiency is substantial and can
serve as a model for how courts and administrative agencies can work in
tandem to shape public policy, even in the face of political gridlock. How-
ever, the Texas Legislature has not gone far enough. Lawmakers have re-
peatedly refused to pass a compulsory unitization statute, likely due to
reluctance to burden politically persuasive individual operators. In response
to the Legislature’s failure to act, the Texas Railroad Commission and the
Texas Supreme Court have again issued rulings that rely on equitable prin-
ciples to eliminate some of the advantages of refusing to unitize. The Legis-
lature should follow the lead of the court and pass a compulsory unitization
statute, ensuring efficient production, reducing environmental harm, and
eliminating waste.
A. The Pre-MIPA World
Professor Weaver describes the United States as “a nation of marginal,
idle, and orphaned wells.”15 Under the common law ad coelum doctrine, the
ownership of a piece of land extends from the center of the earth up into
the heavens. Rights to oil and gas have been primarily based on two theories
of property: ownership in place and the exclusive right to drill. Ownership
in place is based on the fee simple determinable and gives the property
owner an interest in the oil. The exclusive right to drill, by contrast, is a
nonownership theory based on a profit-a`-prendre, the right to enter land and
take a part of the natural resources of the land. Under this nonownership
theory, a property interest vests in only the person that removes the oil
from the ground, however removal of the oil is still limited by the owner’s
right to exclude others from his property.16
The first legal question addressed by the courts was who held title to
the extracted oil or gas. In the beginning, there was the rule of capture. This
rule holds that “the person who reaches [oil] by means of a well, and severs
it from the realty, and converts it into personality” holds title to the oil.17
Under the rule of capture, a mineral rights owner was entitled to drill a well
and produce as much oil as he could without liability for drainage of his
neighbor’s property. His neighbors were powerless to enjoin his production
or to share in its proceeds. Instead, courts held that the best defense against
15. Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 190 (2004).
16. See Colleen Lamarre, Note, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 468-70
(2011).
17. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
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drainage was to “go and do likewise.”18 Because there may be (and usually
are) several owners of surface tracts overlying an oil field, the rule of cap-
ture enabled a producer to gain the full benefit of his production while
sharing the negative externalities of overproduction (e.g., prematurely lost
field pressure) with the other owners. This rule created an incentive to
maximize individual production without regard for the negative field-wide
consequences of overproduction.19 This classic tragedy of the commons re-
sulted in “a system that compels [an operator] to increase his [production]
without limit in a world that is limited.”20
As surely as the nascent oil and gas law encouraged haste, it also created
incentive for strategic behavior. Savvy producers acted quickly to strategi-
cally place wells to preemptively drain their neighbors’ property. Early pro-
ducers drilled far more wells than necessary to efficiently recover oil and
gas from fields. Images of the Spindletop oil field near Beaumont, Texas in
1903 show oil derricks situated side-by-side as producers scrambled to sink
as many wells as possible. These wells pumped at rates far exceeding the
maximum efficient rate of recovery, quickly depleting the reservoir’s natural
pressure and leaving a substantial amount of oil underground and
irretrievable.
Owners seeking to protect themselves from the economic consequences
of drainage found no recourse in the courts. A case typifying Texas courts’
approach to oil production and royalty allocation under the rule of capture
was Japhet v. McRae.21 In Japhet, the owner of a fifteen-acre tract of land,
Fischer, leased the mineral rights of the tract to a production company.
Shortly after, Fisher conveyed the north five acres to Keeble, who sold three
of those acres to McRae. Eighteen months later, Fisher conveyed his re-
maining ten acres to Keeble, who sold them to Japhet. All of the convey-
ances mentioned the production lease and each deed provided that the
owner should have all rights of the original lessor (including production
royalties). Japhet convinced the production company to drill a well on his
ten acres, and upon discovery of a large quantity of oil, received a one-
18. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907).
19. Oil production exploits natural pressure to force crude oil up the well bore from
the reservoir. The efficiency of production depends on two major factors: well spacing and
rate of production. Overproduction results in a loss of this natural pressure, which, in the
absence of secondary recovery efforts, causes waste by leaving oil underground.
20. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968).
21. 276 S.W. 669 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1925). Though this case was heard by the Com-
mission of Appeals, the judgment was entered as the judgment of the Texas Supreme Court.
Id. at 672; see also Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. at 401, supra note 17 (holding that the rule
of capture allowed the defendant to drill a series of wells along the lease property line in an
intentional effort to drain oil from adjacent tracts; plaintiff could protect his interests by
drilling his own series of wells on his side of the property line).
Spring 2015] Mineral Interest Development in the Lone Star State 391
eighth share in production, per the terms of the production company’s origi-
nal lease with Fisher. McRae and Keeble sued, collectively seeking a third
of the royalties paid to Japhet. The court, citing a corollary to the rule of
capture that “oil is a part of the realty until brought to the surface,” held
that apportionment of the royalty was unwarranted.22 Japhet was solely en-
titled to the royalties produced from his land and his neighbors’ only de-
fense was to seek a spacing exception to drill his own well. Clearly, while
the holding of Japhet may have fit within the bounds of the law of the day,
the decision presented an unsustainable solution to the problems created by
the rule of capture.
B. The Small Tract Advantage
To combat waste caused by the free-for-all created by the rule of cap-
ture, the Commission first implemented spacing rules to regulate the physi-
cal location of the wells and later issued prorationing rules (allowables) to
control the rate of production. Spacing rules take into account the drainage
radius of the particular kind of well—typically, oil wells drain from an area
with a radius of roughly forty acres and gas wells from roughly 650 acres,
though each field varies based on actual geologic conditions. Prorationing
orders “cartelized” Texas oil production: the orders characterized price-re-
ducing overproduction as economic waste and then reduced each well’s al-
lowable to prevent that waste, creating artificial scarcity to artificially inflate
the price of oil.23
While prorationing orders were intended to prevent waste resulting
from the rule of capture, their implementation created an incentive for
small tract drilling. Allowables set by these orders were determined on a
per-well and per-acre basis. For oil wells, the typical formula set total allow-
ables based on a one-half per well, one-half per acre proration formula. For
gas wells, the formula set allowables based on a one-third per well and two-
thirds per acre proration formula. In either case, the minimum allowable
provided for a “living allowable,” a condition that ensured operation of the
well would still be profitable. This gave small tract owners the ability to
22. The court’s opinion reflected the general lack of understanding of oilfield geology
available to experts at the time. Citing the fact that productive wells were often located “side
by side” with dry wells, the court noted that the mystifying nature of oil as a fugitive,
migratory resource prevented a legal presumption that Japhet’s well drained from Keeble and
McRae’s land. Id. at 671. It seems as though a showing that Japhet’s well did in fact drain
Keeble and McRae’s land may have changed the court’s opinion in this case.
23. Weaver, supra note 15, at 190. Juan Pablo Pe´rez Alfonso, the Venezuelan politician
primarily responsible for the creation of OPEC, used the Texas Railroad Commission as a
model for a regulatory entity that used its police power to influence oil prices to reduce
economic waste. Cuervo, supra note 13, at 572-81.
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drain from neighbors’ land with impunity. Originally, Texas courts did
nothing to stop this practice.
In Halbouty v. Darsey,24 plaintiffs challenged a decision by the Commis-
sion to issue a permit for a well on a 0.48-acre site overlying reserves valued
at an estimated $20,000 when the cost of drilling and extraction would be at
least $250,000. To achieve a living allowable, the well would necessarily
have to drain a substantial amount of gas from reserves underlying neigh-
boring properties. The owners of the surrounding tracts offered to pool the
0.48 acre tract, but the small tract owner refused, and the appellate court
was bound by precedent to approve the unfair allowable: “The unconditional
offer to pool the 0.48 acre tract with surrounding tracts in the field can in
no event defeat the permit under the facts here. This is not a matter over
which the Commission had been given jurisdiction to require, but is a sub-
ject for voluntary agreement.”25 The only factors the court considered rele-
vant were the vested right of property owners to recover oil and gas from
beneath their land and whether or not the land had been properly subdi-
vided.26 Independent producers, who were more likely to be small tract
owners, fought early efforts to pass a compulsory statute that would reduce
the frequency of arguably unfair results such as the Halbouty case.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, was not bound by the same con-
straints that kept the appeals court from changing the status quo and was
soon confronted with a case that “presented a clear choice . . . to encourage
efficiency and greater ultimate recover in the gas fields, or to allow the old
order to reign even in new fields.”27
II. THE Normanna DECISION
In Atlantic Refining Company v. Railroad Commission of Texas
(Normanna),28 the Atlantic Refining Company, along with another oil com-
pany and five individuals (collectively referred to as Atlantic), brought suit
24. 326 S.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) (writ ref’d n.r.e.). In Texas, n.r.e.
means no reversible error: the lower court opinion may not be entirely correct, but the
petition presents no error that is reversible. See THE GREENBOOK: TEXAS RULES OF FORM, Ap-
pendix E (Texas Law Review Ass’n ed., 12th ed. 2010).
25. Halbouty, 326 S.W.2d at 532 (citing Dailey v. R.R. Comm’n, 133 S.W.2d 219
(Tex. Civ. App. 1939)).
26. Shockingly, the court even disregarded the fact that the location of the drill site
might create “hazard to life and to property” because those considerations were not grounds
on which the Commission could deny a Rule 37 spacing exception. Id. at 532-33.
27. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS (1986) (herein-
after WEAVER, UNITIZATION).
28. 346 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1961). This case is commonly referred to as the Normanna
case because it dealt with allowables on tracts overlying the Normanna Gas field in Bee
County, Texas.
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to annul a Commission order which set allowables based on the standard
one-third per well, two-thirds per acre proration formula for the newly-
discovered Normanna gas field. Such a rule “means that 1/3 of the total field
allowable must be divided equally among all the wells in the field and that
2/3 of the total field allowable will be divided among all the wells on a per
acreage basis.”29 The appellee, a partnership called Bright & Schiff, owned a
0.3-acre lot30 adjacent to Atlantic’s tract on the Normanna Field. Although
the Commission had established a 320-acre spacing pattern for the
Normanna Field, Bright & Schiff applied for and received a Rule 37 spacing
exception,31 which allowed them to place a well on their small tract. Under
the Commission’s production proration rule, Bright & Schiff would be al-
lowed to produce over two hundred times more gas per-acre than a well
spaced at 320 acres. Expert testimony produced by Atlantic estimated that
the total value of the gas underlying Bright & Schiff’s tract was roughly
$7000. However, under the Commission’s rule, Bright & Schiff would be
allowed to produce an estimated $2.5 million worth of gas over the twenty-
year life of the well. In addition, if the court approved the Commission’s
order, Atlantic would be unable to recover damages for drainage of its field
due to the rule of capture.
The trial court, relying primarily on Ryan Consolidated Petroleum Corp.
v. Pickens,32 determined that the Commission’s order was valid. In Pickens,
both Ryan and Pickens applied for permits to drill on recently subdivided
lots. Pickens’ permit was approved by the Commission, and Ryan’s was de-
nied. After litigation determined that the permitting process was valid,
Ryan sued for an equitable share of the oil produced from Pickens’ well
based on Ryan’s proportionate ownership of the tract. Citing the rule of
capture, the Pickens court refused to grant Ryan’s requested relief. The
Texas Supreme Court distinguished Normanna from Pickens, holding that
the rule of capture did not have any bearing on the evaluation of the valid-
ity of an order from the Commission. After citing several cases that over-
turned Commission orders that resulted in disproportionate recovery
29. Id. at 803.
30. The lot was 79 feet wide and 130 feet long, actually slightly less than 0.3 acres. Id.
at 802.
31. 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.37(h). Such exceptions may be granted upon the appli-
cant establishing that a spacing exception “is necessary either to prevent waste or to prevent
the confiscation of property.” 16 Tex. Admin. Code § 3.37(a)(3). “Confiscation” refers prin-
cipally to drainage. See Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (Tex.
1939) (defining confiscation as “depriving the owner or lessee of a fair chance to recover the
oil and gas under his land, or the equivalent in kind.”).
32. 285 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. 1955). Pickens was famed corporate raider T. Boone Pickens.
A year after this case, he founded the company that would eventually become Mesa Petro-
leum, which he grew to one of the largest independent petroleum companies in the world.
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amounts for small tract owners,33 the court invalidated the Commission’s
order:
Viewing all the facts in the light of the substantial evidence rule,
we think the 1/3-2/3 proration formula is an unreasonable basis
upon which to prorate the gas production from this reservoir. It
does not come close to compelling ratable production; neither does
it afford each producer in the field an opportunity to produce his
fair share of the gas from the reservoir.34
The Normanna court did not offer a rule or standard to guide the Com-
mission other than to say that, “[t]he responsibility rests with the Commis-
sion to devise some rule of proration which will conserve the gas in the field
in question and at the same time be fair and just to all parties without
depriving any of them of his property.”35 However, even in the absence of a
clear standard, Normanna became precedent for overruling Commission
proration orders that were “arbitrary, unreasonable and confiscatory of [op-
erators’] property.”36
A. Reaction to Normanna
The Normanna decision, handed down on March 8, 1961, caused admin-
istrative headaches at the Commission, as well as a flurry of commentary
among those interested in Texas oil and gas law. An essay published shortly
after the decision catalogued responses from the Commission and various
commentators.37 Normanna effectively eliminated the Commission’s ability
to favor small tract owners over large. In a later order, the Commission
outlined its struggle to strike a fair balance between the rights of small and
large tract owners in the absence of statutory authority to compel pooling:
[B]ecause of the additional responsibility placed upon the Commis-
sion [as a result of the Normanna decision], as knotty a problem as
has ever been placed before the Commission must be solved, that in
33. E.g., Corzelius v. Harrell, 179 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) (writ granted,
subsequently dismissed as moot) (holding that the Commission was under the duty prorate
gas production such that owners of two adjacent tracts would not drain from each others
holdings); Marrs v. R.R. Comm’n, 177 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1944) (invalidating a Commission
order because the allowable was “entirely out of proportion” to the oil under each tract).
34. Atlantic Refining Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 346 S.W. 2d at 812.
35. Id.
36. Halbouty v. R.R. Comm’n, 357 S.W.2d 364, 369 (Tex. 1962) (explicitly following
Normanna in invalidating a 1/3 - 2/3 proration order). This case is commonly referred to as
the Port Acres decision.
37. Clyde Brown, Does the Normanna Decision Herald a New Trend in Texas Oil and Gas
Regulatory Practices, 6 S. TEX. L.J. 32 (1961-62).
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all probability is best resolved through the use of a special allowable
that would encourage a small tract owner to negotiate with his
neighbors for fair and just treatment, but would also provide a suf-
ficient allowable to such small tract to encourage a reasonable atti-
tude in such neighbors so that they would endeavor to work out
this common problem . . .38
The Commission proceeded to establish a default allocation formula
based solely on acreage. However, in the same order (in Rule 3(b)), the
Commission created an exception for gas wells on tracts fewer than one
hundred acres. If an applicant could show that (1) he could not economically
operate a well on his small tract based on a per-acre allowable, and (2) that
owners of adjacent tracts had refused to pool with the applicant, the Com-
mission would grant the small tract the same allowable that would be availa-
ble to a one hundred-acre tract. This rule required owners of small tracts to
attempt to reach voluntary pooling agreements with their neighbors, but
gave them greater bargaining power in the process.
While Normanna did not affect the rules in place in the East Texas
fields,39 relatively new field orders subjected to a timely challenge were
struck down under the Normanna precedent.40 The combined actions of the
court and the Commission, resulted in a de facto compulsory pooling re-
gime. Commentators began seriously discussing the increasing appropriate-
ness of a compulsory pooling statute, and independent producers, who had
previously fought tooth and nail to prevent such legislation, hastily com-
posed a bill to present to the legislature.41
A fundamental question is why the Texas Supreme Court decided to
abruptly engage in such a clear example of judicial activism and overturn
over thirty years of precedent. The dissent in Normanna argued that the
court was “creating compulsory pooling, directly contrary to the legislative
declaration of intent that the Commission was not authorized to require
that separately owned tracts be unitized.”42 Of course, while the court never
explicitly required pooling, its order, combined with the Commission’s new
allowable formula resulted in a de facto compulsory regime. Professor
38. Id. at 36 (citing Tex. R.R. Comm’n, O. & G. Docket No. 129, no. 2-46,673).
39. Citing the doctrine of laches, the Texas Supreme Court refused to overturn field
rules that producers had acquiesced to in the Hawkins and Yates fields, and the 50-50 prora-
tion orders in those fields stood. See R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Aluminum Co. of America,
380 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1964).
40. See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Shell Oil Co., 380 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1964).
41. See, e.g., Ernest E. Smith, The Texas Compulsory Pooling Act, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1003
(1965).
42. WEAVER, UNITIZATION at 127.
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Weaver attributes the court’s change in opinion to economic pressures
caused by excess production and falling prices, combined with the rising
price of drilling wells. In addition, newly producing fields, like the one at
Port Acres,43 required more sophisticated management techniques like gas
cycling to recover gas condensate that would otherwise be lost if the field
were not operated as a single unit. Compulsory pooling had become an
economic necessity, and not even the powerful independents could delay
the inevitable.
B. The Passage of MIPA
Less than five years after Normanna, the Texas Legislature passed the
statute that became MIPA.44 This statute gave the Commission the author-
ity to compel pooling of separately owned mineral interests in the same
field upon application by a qualified interest owner and “for the purpose of
avoiding the drilling of unnecessary wells, protecting correlative rights, or
preventing waste.”45 Pooled units are usually, though not exclusively,
formed for primary recovery of oil and gas resources. As stated in the Texas
Practice Series,
The purpose of the Mineral Interest Pooling Act . . . is to permit
the owner of a tract embracing only a small part of an oil and gas
reservoir to participate fairly in the production from the reservoir
and, conversely, to protect the owner of a larger portion of a reser-
voir from unfair drainage from a tract embracing only a small por-
tion of a reservoir.46
In order to achieve these goals, MIPA requires that private parties
demonstrate that they have exhausted attempts to reach a private agreement
to pool, and then gives the Commission the authority to compel pooling.
While MIPA was based on other states’ compulsory pooling statutes, it is
complicated and contains provisions not analogous to those other statutes.47
Most commentators agree that the purpose of MIPA is primarily to en-
courage voluntary pooling rather than for the Commission to actually issue
pooling orders.
43. See Halbouty, supra note 36.
44. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-102.112 (West).
45. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (West).
46. 4 ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD, TEX. PRACTICE SERIES - LAND TITLES AND TITLE EXAMINATION
§ 23.38 490 (3rd ed. 2013).
47. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.27 (West 2014).
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1. MIPA’s Requirements
MIPA § 102.011 specifies the elements that must be present before the
Commission can exercise authority to force pooling. Courts and commenta-
tors have interpreted this section to require: (1) two or more separately
owned tracts, (2) lying within a common reservoir, (3) for which field rules
have been established, (4) where separately owned interests in oil and gas
are within an existing or proposed proration unit, (5) the interest owners
have not agreed to voluntarily pool their interests, and (6) at least one inter-
est owner has drilled or proposes to drill a well within the proration unit.48
In addition, before an applicant receives a pooling order under MIPA, the
applicant must first show that she has made a “fair and reasonable offer” to
pool.49
Certain categories of fields are excluded from the operation of the stat-
ute. Reservoirs that were discovered and produced before March 8, 1961
(the date of the Normanna decision) may not be pooled under MIPA,50 nor
may lands owned by the State of Texas.51 Units pooled under MIPA may
not exceed 160 acres for oil wells (or 640 acres for gas wells) regardless of
the size of the standard spacing unit in the applicable field,52 and MIPA
may not be invoked to pool two tracts that each separately have sufficient
acreage to create a spacing unit under the applicable field rule.53 Finally, an
applicant must show that the acreage that she seeks to pool “reasonably
appears to lie within the productive limits of the reservoir.”54
2. Imprint of Independent Producers on MIPA
As might be predicted, a bill drafted by independent producers tended
to favor independent producers. For example, MIPA only applies to fields
discovered after the Normanna decision and does not apply to exploratory
drilling. The Commission cannot initiate pooling; so in the absence of an
application to pool, operators are still granted spacing exceptions and al-
lowed to drain from neighboring tracts. The pooled unit sizing limit pre-
cludes use of MIPA to accomplish field-wide unitization, and the
requirement of a fair and reasonable offer forces applicants to negotiate
with small tract owners before going though the hassle of an administrative
48. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (West); see also Ronnie Blackwell, Forced Pool-
ing within the Barnett Shale: How Should The Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act Apply to Units
with Horizontal Wells?, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 7 (2010).
49. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.013 (West).
50. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.003 (West).
51. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.004 (West).
52. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (West).
53. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.014 (West).
54. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.018 (West).
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proceeding. Small tract owners are also allowed to apply for pooling, which
enables them to muscle into larger tracts. Finally, small tract owners can
elect to pay drilling expenses out of their royalties, allowing them to avoid
the front-end financial risk of drilling a dry well.
It is important to note that the appropriate state policy when it comes
to forcing pooling may vary according to a number of factors. For example,
Ohio and New York require that operators pool tracts before they start drill-
ing. This may be because the relatively high degree of spacing unit frag-
mentation in those states creates a greater interest in up-front authorization
(because drilling a well will affect more neighbors). This may slow the de-
velopment of oil and gas resources, but it preemptively protects the rights
of many who may suffer from collective action problems (e.g. high transac-
tion costs) to combat unwanted production if the default right allows drill-
ing. Texas, by contrast, presumptively allows drilling in the absence of
pooling. This may be because the relatively light fragmentation of Texas’
spacing units means that fewer neighbors will be affected by the drilling of
a well.55 Further, if neighbors do not want the well, there are fewer to
organize, which reduces the transaction costs involved in asserting their own
property rights.56 In this sense, Texas sticks to its strong tradition of pro-
tecting the property rights of the individual by requiring the affirmative
assertion of rights by a wronged neighbor. This balance is part of the reason
that MIPA is so effective. This policy, which threatens compulsory action
to favor voluntary agreements, should serve as a model for Texas legislators
to pass a compulsory unitization statute.
III. UNITIZATION
Unitization is “the operation of separately owned tracts of land for oil
and gas as if they are one tract under one ownership and with disregard to
property lines or interests, except for the apportionment of the costs and
proceeds . . . whether the aggregate of the area developed is large or
small.”57 In the absence of compulsory unitization statutes, the many owners
of a field’s mineral interests must unanimously agree to operate as a unit.
Despite the advantages that unitization may provide for all parties, unani-
mous approval of a field-wide unitization plan is rare. Absent statutory au-
55. Texas has an average of about seven leases per field, whereas Oklahoma has an
average of over thirteen. Stuart T. MacDonald, Land Tenure Patterns and Unitization Legisla-
tion: Evidence from Texas and Oklahoma, 12 SW. BUS. & ECON. J. 1, 5 (2003-04).
56. Lindsey Trachtenberg, Note, Reconsidering the Use of Forced Pooling for Shale Gas
Development, 19 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 200-01 (2012). Pooling has also been suggested as a
remedy against drainage caused by hydraulic fracturing that crosses lease lines. See Costal Oil
& Gas Co. v. Garza Energy Trust, 263 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
57. 1 W. L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 5.49 (3d ed. 2004).
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thority, courts have refused to compel unitization, even in the face of
tremendous waste. For example, in Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Superior Oil Co.,58
the California Court of Appeals approved the decision of owners of tracts
overlying the Paloma Oil Field not to operate the field as a single unit,
despite plaintiff’s allegations (taken as true) that unitizing would enable the
production of an additional $166 million worth of oil, gas, and condensate.
A. History of Unitization in Texas
Texas remains the only state in the nation without a compulsory uni-
tization statute, despite the fact that “[s]uch a statute is universally recog-
nized as necessary to assure the maximum efficient recovery of oil and gas
while also allocating fair shares of a field’s bounty to the different operators
of leases overlying a common reservoir.”59 Because of the difficulties associ-
ated with voluntary unitization, all states producing oil and gas in any seri-
ous capacity (Texas excluded) have enacted a compulsory unitization
statute.60 While the majority of states allow for compulsory unitization to
prevent waste, improve overall recovery, reduce the number of unnecessary
wells, or protect correlative rights, some states have provided for limited
compulsory unitization to bolster secondary recovery efforts.61
Hostility toward unitizing oil fields has a long history in Texas. In 1931,
legislators passed a bill that strengthened the ability of the Commission to
combat wasteful practices. But in outlining the scope of the term “waste,”
the legislators ensured that the law would not be used to require unitization.
The definition of waste, which has survived from 1931 to the present day,
includes,
[W]aste or loss incident to or resulting from the unnecessary, inef-
ficient, excessive, or improper use of the reservoir energy, includ-
ing the gas energy or water drive, in any well or pool; however, it is
not the intent of this section or the provisions of this chapter . . . to
require repressuring of an oil pool or to require that the separately
owned properties in any pool be unitized under one management,
control, or ownership.62
At the time of this law’s passage, the hostility toward unitization was
understandable. Independent producers and legislators wanted to avoid the
58. 206 P.2d 944 (Cal. App. 1949).
59. Weaver, supra note 15, at 187.
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 31.05.110 (West); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.1; CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 3320.2; OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 287.4.
61. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3643(c).
62. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(a)(7).
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evils of monopoly threatened by the vertically integrated major oil compa-
nies that controlled the vast majority of U.S. pipelines. During testimony
leading to the passage of the 1931 statute, the party that spoke most force-
fully in favor of unitization of the East Texas field was William Farish,
president of Humble Oil (which later became Exxon). Humble, as the larg-
est producer in the area, controller of the pipelines, and owner of the refin-
eries, sought to operate the field, and independent producers were unwilling
to relinquish their claims for fear of being excluded by the widely maligned
corporate giant.63
A second concern that caused legislators to balk at compulsory unitiza-
tion was the perceived lack of institutional competence of the Railroad
Commission. The “mysterious, fugitive nature” of oil resources made it dif-
ficult for the Commission to understand oil and gas production and even
more difficult to promulgate and enforce regulations.64 Uncertainty sur-
rounding the physical nature of the oil and gas in a reserve also led to
problems related to royalty allocation. There were nearly six hundred small
operators on the East Texas field. They were not producing in equal
amounts nor were their leases of uniform size. In fact, data from the period
show that these independent operators had conjured forty-nine percent of
the field’s total production from only twenty percent of the acreage of the
field. If the field were to be unitized, the Commission would need to deter-
mine the “fair shares” of each of the producers. The difficulty in determin-
ing fair share would be a daunting task in a political vacuum but was nearly
impossible when “no independent would willingly settle for a fair share
when he had gained an unfair share from the unregulated commons.”65
B. Empirical Studies
Professor Weaver argues that despite Texas’ lack of a compulsory uni-
tization statute, the Railroad Commission has nevertheless been able to en-
courage unitization of many Texas oil and gas fields through field orders
amounting to “not-so-subtle coercion.” By examining data from the late sev-
enties and early eighties, she determined that at least forty-eight percent of
Texas’ total oil production in that era came from voluntarily unitized fields.
By contrast, in Oklahoma, a maximum of thirty-nine percent of its oil pro-
duction came from unitized fields. It may seem surprising that Texas pro-
duces a larger proportion of its oil from unitized areas, particularly
63. Weaver, supra note 15, at 189. Humble, in these days before common carrier legisla-
tion, had gained a reputation for using its pipeline power to coerce small operators into
selling their leases at discounted prices.
64. See Japhet, supra note 16.
65. Weaver, supra note 15, at 189.
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considering that Oklahoma has had a compulsory unitization statute since
1945.66
A more recent study also compared unitization in Texas and
Oklahoma.67 Professor MacDonald found that while less than four percent
of Texas fields sampled were officially unitized, over sixty-five percent of
the fields sampled were operated by a single producer. If a single operator
has the rights to an entire field, that field is unified de facto. By contrast,
during the same time frame, MacDonald found that twenty-five percent of
Oklahoma’s fields were officially unitized but only eighteen percent were
operated by a single operator, resulting in a lower de facto proportion of
unitization. Further, Professor MacDonald pointed out that pressure-main-
tenance secondary recovery operations occurred in eighty-five percent of
Texas’ largest fields, a fact which suggests that such operations can and do
occur in the absence of a compulsory unitization statute.
These studies suggest that Texas has had some success in cooperative
secondary recovery efforts. However, “the real question is not how much
unitization has occurred. . .but how much more is needed.”68 The answer to
this question depends on whom you ask. Predictably, major oil producers
want unitization, while the independents do not. Texas produced
769,501,187 barrels of crude oil in 2013 and over 814,537,759 barrels of
crude oil in 2014.69 While there is wide variation among fields, on average,
unitization agreements increase oil recovery by nearly seventeen million
barrels over the life of the field.70
C. Efforts to Pass a Compulsory Unitization Statute
Texas’ current unitization agreements are not achieved through Com-
mission orders. Instead, the Commission merely authorizes agreements for
the “cooperative development”71 of separately owned properties for secon-
dary recovery efforts, including gas cycling, repressuring, and water flood-
ing.72 No person may be compelled to join these agreements and those who
66. WEAVER, UNITIZATION at 316 (“This percentage is a minimum because it does not
include production from fields that are completely owned by one landowner and leased to
one operator, which therefore can be produced as a unit . . .”).
67. MacDonald, supra note 55.
68. WEAVER, UNITIZATION at 323.
69. Railroad Commission of Texas, Texas Monthly Oil and Gas Production (2008-
2014), available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/oil-gas/research-and-statistics/production-data/
texas-monthly-oil-gas-production/.
70. WEAVER, UNITIZATION at 317.
71. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 101 (West).
72. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 101.011 (West).
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choose not to join are not bound by the agreement’s terms.73 The Commis-
sion will only approve cooperative development agreements if they find,
after providing the statutorily required notice and hearings, that such an
agreement promotes the public welfare, does not infringe on rights of per-
sons not party to the agreement, that the costs of secondary recovery do not
exceed the value of additional oil and gas recovered, and that the agreement
does not cover more acreage than reasonably necessary to effectuate the
secondary recovery effort.74 These agreements usually happen late in the
life of an oil field, long after production has fallen below peak levels, and
still allow for strategic holding out by owners in position to benefit from the
secondary recovery efforts of others.75
In 2013, Texas State Representative Van Taylor introduced Texas
House Bill 100, The Oil and Gas Majority Rights Protection Act (MRPA).
This bill would enable the Commission to compel unitization if approved by
seventy percent of the working interest holders.76 Similar bills had been
introduced in previous legislative sessions. These bills were brought forth
mostly by conservative Republicans.77 Such proposals have caused heated,
even vitriolic debate among producers, interest holders, commentators, and
legislators.78 For example, in 1999, a compulsory unitization bill was intro-
duced in the Texas House that would allow the Commission to order uni-
tization if eighty percent of the property and mineral rights owners agreed.
During testimony at the Texas Capital, opponents of the bill characterized
it as confiscatory and a threat to private property rights. Professor Weaver
testified that the Commission and the courts had already agreed that the
prevention of waste takes precedent over private property rights. Represen-
tative Joe Crabb replied that her argument that the public interest should
supersede private property rights “sounds like something Hitler said.”79
73. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 101.012 (West).
74. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 101.013 et seq. (West).
75. See generally Murray & Cross, supra note 10, at 1125 (describing an attempted uni-
tization effort).
76. H.B. 100, §§ 104.001, 104.056, 83rd Leg. (Tex. 2013).
77. E.g., H.B. 1624, 76th Leg. (Tex. 1999).
78. See Associated Press, Oilmen Claim Divisive Action, THE VICTORIA ADVOCATE, Oct. 17,
1974, available at https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=6gpaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=bEsNAAA
AIBAJ&pg=5214%2C2915049; see also Charles Sartain, Compulsory Unitization Undermines
Texas Values, ENERGY AND THE LAW (March 12, 2013), available at http://www.energyandthelaw
.com/2013/03/12/compulsor-unitization-undermines-texas-values-rhetorically-speaking/.
79. Philip Parker, Oil Families Tell House Panel Unitization Bill Is Unnecessary, LUBBOCK
AVALANCHE-JOURNAL, March 31, 1999, http://lubbockonline.com/stories/033199/
bus_033199011.shtml. On his 1999 election finance filing report, Crabb disclosed that he and
his wife owned 5,100-13,998 shares of Exxon Mobil, then valued at $188,343-$516,946 (au-
thor’s calculations). Crabb continued to represent Texas House District 127 until his retire-
ment in 2010. See Joe F. Crabb, Personal Financial Statement, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE RECORDS
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Proponents of the most recent legislation argue that compulsory uni-
tization increases efficiency and conservation; fewer wells with better man-
agement should be utilized to prevent waste by permitting recovery of a
greater percentage of the oil and gas in the field. Of course, this result
would lead to greater overall royalties. As a related matter, unitization pro-
tects surface owners and reduces environmental impact. Fewer wells mean
fewer of the physical impacts that are concurrent with well development:
surface facilities, trucks, lights, noise, etc. Fewer wells managed by a single,
large unit operator are also more likely to be carefully maintained, resulting
in fewer accidents and spills. Finally, proponents argue that unitization cre-
ates jobs.
Opponents of compulsory unitization legislation characterize such laws
as infringing on individual property rights and argue that compulsory uni-
tization threatens their liberty. Unitization eliminates their freedom to con-
tract with producers and the MRPA would also authorize the Commission
to amend or abrogate surface use protections that conflict with unit opera-
tions. From a financial perspective, small operations may suffer under risk
penalties, which allow for a lien on “proceeds of production due to any
working interest owner who is not paying the owner’s share of the costs of
unit operation as compensation to the paying owner or owners.”80 Small
operators argue that they will not be able to pay their proportion of upfront
costs for multimillion dollar carbon dioxide advanced recovery projects, sub-
jecting them to a possible penalty of up to three hundred percent of the cost
and eliminating current income from their small producing wells.81
According to the modern debate, whether compulsory unitization is a
good idea depends on whether one thinks private property rights should be
limited to maximize public welfare. Texas legislators seem to have made up
their minds: Representative Taylor’s bill never left committee review. But
they should reconsider their opposition to a compulsory unitization statute.
The debate over the proposed law has focused primarily on the competition
between private property and the benefits of increased recovery. Legislators
have conspicuously neglected to discuss the negative externalities imposed
on the State caused by inefficient practices. When the costs of abandoned
wells and contaminated site remediation are considered, the scales tip firmly
in favor of passing a compulsory unitization statute designed to increase
recovery and minimize the number of wells used to effectuate recovery.
(Feb. 14, 2000), http://records.texastribune.org/personal-finance/joe-crabb-1999-financials-
00020049-135859.pdf.
80. Supra, note 71, at § 104.108.
81. Id.
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IV. THE COSTS OF COMBATTING THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-DRILLING
The unfortunate (yet predictable) result of the refusal to pass a compul-
sory unitization statute is that Texas leads the nation in the number of
marginally producing, idle, and orphan wells.82 In order for inactive wells to
stay compliant with state regulations, the operators must provide financial
assurance and qualify for a plugging extension. The Commission will de-
clare a well orphaned if the operator fails to keep up with required
paperwork. As of August 2013, the Commission recognized 8644 wells as
orphans.83 These abandoned wells, when not properly plugged, pose envi-
ronmental threats because they create a physical nexus between deep hydro-
carbon reserves, super-salty brines, and shallow underground freshwater
aquifers. To combat the potential harms threatened by such a large number
of abandoned wells, the Texas legislature has designed two programs to re-
duce the number of orphans.
The first program, the Oil Field Cleanup Fund (OFCF), created a
thirty-million-dollar fund for use by the Commission “for any purpose re-
lated to the regulation of oil and gas development, including . . . oil and gas
well plugging.”84 Under the OFCF, the Commission uses fund money to
cap eligible orphaned wells. After the orphan well is capped, the Office of
the Attorney General may bring suit against the responsible operator to
recover costs of capping, as well as civil penalties. The Commission priori-
tizes which wells to cap by examining several factors, including the stage of
well completion, wellbore condition, proximity to environmentally sensitive
areas, and other unique environmental, safety, or economic concerns.85 The
money in the OFCF comes from several sources including production taxes,
hazardous waste generation fees, and enforcement penalties paid by oil and
gas companies. The Commission is required to issue an annual progress
report detailing the program’s activities and finances.86 Since 1992, the
OFCF has been used to plug 29,782 orphaned wells at a total cost of over
$209 million.87
The second program designed to combat the number of abandoned
wells is the Orphan Well Reduction Program (OWRP), which is designed
82. Weaver, supra note 15, at 190. Of course, it might be predicted that Texas would
have the most orphaned wells simply because Texas has the most wells period.
83. R.R. CO M M’N OF TEXAS, OIL AND GAS REGULATION AND CLEANUP PROGRAM ANNUAL
REPORT – FY 2013, available at http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/environmental/ofcfund/expendi-
tures/OFCU2013.pdf (hereinafter OFCF Report 2013).
84. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.067-69 (West).
85. OFCF REPORT 2013, supra note 83, at 16.
86. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.069 (West).
87. OFCF REPORT 2013, supra note 83, at 1.
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to encourage “operators in good standing” to assume operation and regula-
tory responsibility for orphaned wells. After identifying an orphaned well
and filing notice with the Commission, an operator may conduct a limited
visual inspection of the well and elect to petition to be designated as the
well’s operator after proving a possessory interest in the mineral estate (e.g.,
by executing a lease with the mineral rights owner). To encourage participa-
tion in this program, during the first two years of its existence, the Com-
mission waived certain taxes and fees and reimbursed the operator “50 cents
for each foot of well depth if . . . the person [brought] the well back into
continuous active operation or [plugged] the well.”88 Under this two-year
program, the Commission paid $107,000 to operators who plugged thirteen
wells and returned forty-one wells to active production.89
Both the OFCF and OWRP programs have largely been recognized as
successful and have plugged virtually all orphaned wells categorized as
highest priority. Though there are currently over 8000 orphan wells re-
maining, this is a substantial reduction in the number of orphan wells that
would exist in the absence of such a program.90
In addition to reducing the number of orphan wells, the Commission
engages in contaminated site remediation. In 2013, it conducted 280
cleanup activities, including twenty-seven emergency operations, at a total
cost of $7,596,106.91 The Commission has also established programs to en-
courage private parties to incur their own expenses in remediating contami-
nated sites. For parties that did not contribute to the contamination of the
site, the Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) seeks to “provide an incentive
to remediate property by removing the liability to the state of lenders, de-
velopers, owners, and operators who did not cause or contribute to contami-
nation.”92 As part of the VCP, a non-contributing person may remediate a
site (with Commission oversight), and upon completion, will be absolved of
“all liability to the State for cleanup costs” not caused by that person.93 This
program “expedites the return of contaminated properties into productive
use,” and has resulted in the cleanup of sixty-five sites since 1992.94
88. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 89.047-48 (West).
89. Clint Shields, Wells They Leave Behind, FISCAL NOTES (Aug. 2010)at 4, 5, http://www
.window.state.tx.us/comptrol/fnotes/pdf/fn1008.pdf.
90. Id. at 5. The Commission recognized 16,770 orphan wells in 2003. Interestingly,
while the vast majority of orphaned wells are inland wells, the Commission lists 70 offshore
wells as orphans.
91. OFCF REPORT 2013 supra note 83, at 12, 14.
92. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.652 (West).
93. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.660 (West).
94. OFCF REPORT 2013, supra note 83, at 21.
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A second program, the Operator Cleanup Program (OCP), allows own-
ers and operators who did contribute to the contamination of a site to con-
duct their own site cleanups. These actions, usually in environmentally
sensitive areas, are completely operator funded but overseen by the Com-
mission. OCP allows owners and operators to avoid the additional liability
that would be imposed on them by the Attorney General if the Commission
used money from the OFCF to remediate the site. At the same time, OCP
allows the Commission to ensure that the site is remediated to specific stan-
dards. Commission oversight of remediation efforts includes frequent sam-
pling, reporting, and evaluation “to ensure final cleanup is protective of the
public health, safety and the environment.” As of August 2013, there were
close to six hundred OCP cleanups conducted under Commission
oversight.95
While neither the VCP nor the OCP require the direct expenditure of
cleanup funds from the OFCF, the administration costs involved in over-
seeing these programs are substantial and require “considerable staff re-
sources of employees who are paid out of the fund.”96 The Commission did
not provide detailed financial information for administrative expenses allo-
cated by program but reported that over twenty-four million dollars was
spent in administrative costs for fiscal year 2013.97 All costs considered, the
amount that Texas has spent on plugging orphan wells and remediating
sites exceeds a quarter-billion dollars. This number is staggering and pro-
vides yet another example of how drilling of unnecessary wells leads to
inefficiency.
CONCLUSION
These costs—financial, environmental, and administrative—combined
with the millions of barrels of oil foregone due to the lack of enhanced
recovery efforts that would result from compulsory unitization, highlight
the need for Texas to modernize its laws to ease the burden on its courts
and agencies. In Normanna, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that cur-
rent policies were close to sending the state over an economic precipice and
boldly acted to create new policy despite Texas’ traditional disdain for judi-
cial activism. Following the court’s lead, the Commission implemented poli-
cies that limited and penalized selfish behavior. In the years following the
passage of MIPA, the Commission ordered the pooling of hundreds of
tracts that would have otherwise led to the drilling of unnecessary wells. It
95. Id. at 22.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 14. This was over twice the amount originally budgeted for administrative
costs, and approaches the total expenditures for well-plugging operations.
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is doubtless that the mere threat of compulsory pooling facilitated thousands
more voluntary pooling agreements, all with the same effect of eliminating
unnecessary wells.
The economic consequences of the absence of a compulsory unitization
statute are less dire, or at least less obvious. The Commission, having
learned from its experience in creating policies that promote voluntary
pooling, has been able to promote voluntary unitization with a surprisingly
high success rate. Unfortunately, this has given some politicians the impres-
sion that Texas has no need for a compulsory unitization statute. After all, if
it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. But it is broke, or at least the regulatory system
does not work as well as it could. A compulsory unitization statute that
requires a high percentage of operating and royalty interest owners to ap-
prove an agreement before it takes field-wide effect would give ample pro-
tection to private property rights. If an owner does not like the unitization
agreement, he only needs to convince twenty or thirty percent of the other
interest holders (minus whatever percentage the non-consenting owner
holds) that they should not agree to unitize. What a compulsory unitization
statute fails to protect is an individual owner’s ability to hold out on a uni-
tization agreement in order to take advantage of the secondary recovery
operations of his neighbors. The neighbors will then be hesitant to unitize
in the presence of a holdout for fear of getting a bad deal. The hold-out that
is protected in the absence of a compulsory unitization statute may prevent
some fields from ever becoming unitized, and may delay the process for
those that do eventually become unitized, resulting in more wells, more
pollution, and more costs for Texans to bear. The failure to pass a compul-
sory unitization statute is bad for oil recovery, bad for the environment, and
bad for Texas.
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